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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 09/07/2011 Accident number: 728 
Accident time: 11:00 Accident Date: 17/06/2010 
Where it occurred: AF/2802/00362, 
MF0055, Quryak 
Village, Shiber district 
Bamyan Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: None 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: YM-1 AP blast Ground condition: steep slope 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 09/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-21 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
1 
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Central to investigate the de-mining accident 
involving [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] DT-21. The accident occurred at 11:00 
hours on 17 June 2010 at minefield number AF/2802/00362/MF 0055, located in Quryak 
village, Shiber district of Bamyan Province.                                                                                            
SUMMARY: 
Minefield (MF) 0055 is located in a mountainous area which was frontline between belligerent 
groups during the internal war in 1998. From the military point of view the area was important 
for both sides of the conflict factions. Therefore, the AP mines were laid there by Hizb-e-
Wahdat militias to stop the attacks of their opposition (Taliban). So far two mine accidents 
occurred there on local people. 
[Demining group] cleared around 1 sq km highly contaminated area since last year in Shiber 
district of Bamyan province. During the clearance operations they found/destroyed 174 
Iranian YM I AP mines there.   
On 17 June 2010 at 11:00 [the Victim] was busy in his clearance lane in a steep sloping area, 
he lost his balance, got out from his clearance lane to unclear ground, stepped on a YM-I 
mine and the accident happened. According to the investigation report the team is walking 
around one and half hours from the base comp to the MF on daily basis which makes the 
deminers tired. The marking signs in clearance lane were weak and even not distinguishable; 
the gritty and sliding nature of the ground is another risk factor in this specific minefield. Extra 
safety measures are required in such areas, for example creating feet steps in order for 
deminers to be stable during the operations, close supervision and control of the deminers. 
The consequences of this accident were traumatic amputation of left leg below knee plus 
some superficial injuries on right leg and right hand fingers of deminer. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
Poor marking and lack of preparation in such steep sloping area are the main contributing 
factors to this accident. These factors return back to poor supervision and poor site 
operations plan. 
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
• Strengthening supervision should be the main focus of operations departments of all 
mine action organizations.  
• Internal QA system should be improved and frequent monitoring should be conducted 
in such problematic areas.  
• A comprehensive operations plan should be developed by the team command group 
considering all risk factors of the working site.  
• The team command group should make sure that the marking system is as per SOPs 
and maintained properly throughout the operations. 
Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to 
be submitted to the MACCA OPS department by no later than 7 days, effective to the issue 





Victim number: 920 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Hand; minor Leg 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "traumatic amputation of left leg below 
knee plus some superficial injuries on right leg and right hand fingers of deminer". 
 
Analysis 
The primary and secondary cause of this accident are listed as Field Control inadequacy 
because the investigators found that the demining procedures and marking system in use 
were inappropriate and caused the accident. The demining group’s inability to plan and 
control a task appropriately was a significant Management Control Inadequacy. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible 
than the internationals with overall responsibility. 
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